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what extent did the transformed images reflect society's changing historical 
interpretations and values. Perhaps, too, the difference between the old and 
new narratives may not be as totally different as Dawson asserts. Both the 
classic and the revised versions are still firmly rooted in the romantic veneer of 
the western settlement and Northern gold rush and exploration periods. As 
Dawson astutely observes, the new story is more concentrated and certainly 
more consciously tailored to late twentieth century tastes and biases, but 
nevertheless glories in the same nation-building myths. 
Michael Dawson has produced a solidly researched, well-written study, its 
premise compelling and intriguing. But, by devoting an entire work to an 
admittedly important, ground-breaking topic, a misleading impression 
emerges - that mythology malung pre-occupies the attention of the RCMP 
command. On the contrary, despite its flaws, the Force does play a valued role 
in maintaining the peace and prosperity that most Canadians enjoy. Moreover, 
as Dawson demonstrates so effectively, its mythology, however one-sided, 
narrow, and unbalanced, had its origins in reality and also in the values of the 
cultures that produced it. In other words, the latest Mountie image is a product 
of late twentieth century consumer culture. That is us. 
A.A. den Otter 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Nuclear War 
(Ithaca: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
Destroying the Village focuses primarily on Eisenhower's defence policy, 
framing it within discussions of the Truman administration and the legacy 
inherited by Kennedy in his first years as President. Craig takes his bearings 
from George F. Kennan's famous 1946 "Long Telegram" where he spelt out a 
view of Soviet political thinking (paranoid, brutally realistic, and sceptical 
towards the legality of international agreements) that was to inform U.S. 
defence policy for years. Craig argues that Truman's doctrine of massive 
retaliation was modified by Eisenhower under the conviction that the Soviets 
confronted crisis in a way fundamentally alien to the West. "We have no basis 
for thinking," he declared in 1956, "that they abhor destruction as we do." 
Craig pinpoints the preceding year as signalling a fundamental change in war 
planning when Eisenhower ordered the development of Inter-Continental 
Ballistic Missiles, a process accelerated after the launching in 1957 of the 
Sputnik satellite. With this new technology, Craig states, the "last bit of human 
volition in modem war disappeared." The main thrust of his study is to explain 
how Eisenhower's defence policy was designed to reduce the likelihood of 
nuclear war paradoxically by threatening the Soviets with its inevitability if 
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any local conflicts broke out. Committed as he was to preserving American 
security, Eisenhower resisted the calls from his Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles for a policy of flexible response and by the mid-1950s was promoting a 
view that any war between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union would 
automatically escalate into a hll-scale nuclear war. What might seem like 
political threat and confrontation from Eisenhower is glossed by Craig as a 
kind of Cold War realism based on a grim realization of the sheer speed with 
which any nuclear exchange would occur. The crises over the islands of 
Quemoy and Matsu, and over Berlin in 1959, demonstrate a studied refusal by 
Eisenhower to accede to calls for military response. Thus, while he recognized 
the Cold War orthodoxy that virtually any local conflict could inflame 
superpower rivalry, Eisenhower's strategy was to under-respond with studied 
calm, in the hope that such crises would be defused. Berlin was not, however, 
and in his final section Craig shows how Kennedy had to reformulate a Berlin 
policy from scratch. This he did by redefining U.S. interests in West Berlin as 
access and security in that sector. In the event, Khrushchev unilaterally solved 
that crisis, firstly by lifting his ultimatum for Western troops to leave the city 
and then by building the Berlin wall. 
Craig's discussion concentrates closely on the records of defence group 
meetings, particularly those of the National Security Council, and so excels at 
tracing out the shifts - often improvised - of defence policy. He shows that 
Eisenhower (and to a certain extent Kennedy after him) had to fend off 
constant pressures from his advisers and the military when formulating 
"atomic diplomacy." Dulles and the Pentagon, for instance, strongly opposed 
Eisenhower's apparent "all-or-nothing" policy and demands for the army to 
move into action over Berlin may well have influenced the President's famous 
warning about the military-industrial complex. Indeed the rivalry between the 
President and the military is a somewhat suppressed theme in Craig's study, 
coming into focus in the figure of General Lucius Clay who helped trigger the 
first Berlin crisis by his unauthorized release of new currency and who later 
brought about the stand-off between American and Soviet tanks at Checkpoint 
Charlie. Clay exemplified a mindset of regarding the world as made up of 
strategic areas ruled by one or the other superpower when in 1949 he 
complained "We have lost Czechoslovakia. We have lost Finland." The 
attendant distrust of politicians Ied SAC director Curtis LeMay (parodied as 
the cigar-chomping Jack D. Ripper in Doctor Strangelove) and other top 
officers to form a covert plan to take over defence of the nation if it was judged 
necessary, a plan described in the 1962 novel Seven Days in May. 
Clay's standpoint demonstrates what historian John Lewis Gaddis has 
called "geopolitical codes," i.e. sets of operative assumptions about 
contemporary world developments. Craig acknowledges his debt to Gaddis as 
his doctoral supervisor and thereby situates his own study within a general 
historical revision of the Cold War which is currently taking place. Gaddis' 
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seminal Strategies of Containment (1982) mounts an interpretation which 
foregrounds the perceptions of leading political players rather than provable 
facts as shaping developments within the period and the attraction of this 
approach is that it opens up comparisons between diverse documents of the 
Cold War. Alan Nadel's outstanding Containment Culture (1995) has also 
taken a lead from Gaddis revising the latter's "codes" into narratives which 
inform political rhetoric, film and fiction alike. Nuclear strategy was the most 
hypothetical narrative of all since the threatened war could scarcely be 
imagined and should be avoided at all costs. In that sense Eisenhower emerges 
from Craig's account as the archetypal Cold War politician, threatening an 
ultimate event which must never happen. Within this context, politics took on 
a dimension of posture and theatre which emerges constantly throughout 
Craig's history. When McGeorge Bundy said of the closing of the West Berlin 
border "the problem was essentially one of propaganda," his statement was 
true to the game-like rules of megapolitics, but offered little comfort to those 
Berliners shot while trying to escape to the west. Craig's Eisenhower was 
enough of a realist to oppose the nuclear shelter programme because that 
appeared to condone limited nuclear war; but, Eisenhower objected, "there 
would be no way of living in a situation of such large casualties." By contrast, 
the Kennedy administration at the time of the Cuba crisis distributed thousands 
of leaflets offering largely useless advice about how to convert dens into 
nuclear shelters. This action showed a dangerous blindness to the message 
implicit within such a policy that nuclear war was imminent. Craig 
demonstrates how Eisenhower refused to countenance such measures because 
they would have compromised his conviction that nuclear war was 
unsustainable and because the Soviets would have inferred that actual 
preparations for such a war were under way. Craig thereby disposes once and 
for all in his study the notion that Eisenhower was a political amateur bumbling 
from one problem to another. On the contrary, he played a key role in 
sustaining a policy which minimized the risk of nuclear war. 
David Seed 
Liverpool University 
Hakim Adi, West Africans in Britain, 1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan- 
Africanism and Communism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998). 
Many African nationalist leaders were confirmed in their opposition to 
colonialism by the racism they experienced as university students in Britain. 
But relatively little is known about what African students actually did while 
they were still students. Hakim Adi has set out to fill part of that gap by 
studying West African students' political activities during the first six decades 
